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Plea Bargaining and the Right to the Effective Assistance
of Counsel: Where the Rubber Hits the Road in Capital
Cases
In Lafler v. Cooper1 and Missouri v. Frye,2 the Supreme Court
recognized the obvious: the criminal justice system is ‘‘for
the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.’’3
Very few criminal cases—less than three percent—go to
trial. The rest are resolved through some form of a guilty
plea.4 As scholars have noted, plea bargaining ‘‘is not some
adjunct to the criminal justice system, it is the criminal
justice system.’’5 Given the centrality of plea bargaining in
the current criminal justice system, the Court recognized
that ‘‘the negotiation of a plea bargain, rather than the
unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for
a defendant.’’6 Because of this ‘‘new normal,’’ the Court
concluded that a criminal defendant’s trial counsel has
‘‘responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires in the criminal process at crit-
ical stages.’’7
In Frye, the Court held that defense counsel have ‘‘the
duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to
accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable
to the accused.’’8 It then concluded that that counsel’s
failure to do so was deficient performance under its well-
established Strickland standard for adjudicating ineffective
assistance of counsel claims,9 and remanded to the state
court to determine whether the failure to communicate the
offer was prejudicial, that is, whether there was a ‘‘reason-
able probability that the end result of the criminal process
would have been more favorable by reason of a plea offer to
a lesser charge or a sentence of less prison time.’’10 In
Lafler, decided the same day as Frye, trial counsel advised
the client to turn down a plea bargain based on an errone-
ous understanding of the law. At trial, the defendant was
convicted and given a sentence three and one half times
greater than he would have received under the plea.
Therefore, it was conceded that counsel’s performance was
deficient.11 However, the Court rejected the state’s argu-
ment that Cooper could not show prejudice because he was
found guilty by a jury after a fair trial. It did so reasoning
that ‘‘the question is not the fairness or reliability of the trial
but the fairness and regularity of the processes that pre-
ceded it, which caused the defendant to lose benefits he
would have received in the ordinary course but for coun-
sel’s ineffective assistance.’’12 The Court then held that
ineffective assistance under Strickland had been satisfied
and remanded to order for the state to re-offer the pretrial
plea bargain.
Justice Scalia noted in dissent that the Court has opened
‘‘a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal proce-
dure: plea bargaining law.’’13 And, at least to that extent,
Justice Scalia is clearly correct. In the years to come, courts
will inevitably be required to resolve a number of issues
related to trial counsel’s Sixth Amendment responsibilities
to their clients during plea bargaining. In this short essay, I
will discuss one issue of considerable importance to the
criminal justice system, and one that has received little
attention by courts or scholars: What are trial counsel’s
responsibilities when the prosecution offers a plea to life (or
less) in cases where a defendant is facing the death penalty?
Like other criminal offenses, most death-eligible mur-
der cases are resolved through guilty pleas. Some readers
will be surprised to learn, however, that a very substantial
percentage of the current population of death row—some
estimate the number to be as high as seventy percent of the
inmates14—refused to accept a plea bargain that would have
spared their lives.15 After rejecting the prosecution’s offer,
most of these defendants went to trial, were found guilty at
the guilt-or-innocence phase of the proceedings, and then
were sentenced to death following a penalty hearing. Some
had their convictions or sentences reversed at some point
during the capital appeals process, but some were executed.
In many of these cases, however, reasonably effective
defense counsel would have persuaded the client to accept
the plea.
I do not mean to suggest that it is per se unreasonable to
fail to persuade a client to accept a plea bargain that will
spare his or her life. The DNA exoneration cases, for
example, have established that some capital defendants
who refused to plead guilty and who were then convicted
and sentenced to death were, in fact, innocent.16 However,
in many of the death penalty cases in which defendants
rejected life offers, there was no, or virtually no, chance that
the defendant would be acquitted.17 Furthermore, given the
nature of the offense, the defendant’s prior record, and
other aggravating evidence, it was certainly possible, if not
probable, that the jury would sentence the defendant to
death. Thus the ‘‘deal’’ that the prosecution was offering—
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a guilty plea in exchange for a life sentence—represented in
many cases either the most likely trial outcome or, from the
defendant’s perspective, the best possible trial outcome.18
If that is true, why don’t many capital defendants accept
a plea offer when it is in their best interest to do so?
Interviews with experienced capital defense lawyers indi-
cate several recurring reasons why capital clients reject
favorable plea bargains: (1) the defendant does not trust his
court-appointed counsel; (2) the defendant has (often sig-
nificantly) underestimated the strength of the prosecution’s
case and/or likelihood of conviction at trial; (3) the defen-
dant is too ashamed to admit his or her guilt to family and
friends; and (4) the client’s decision making is impaired by
intellectual deficits, mental illness, and/or the stress of
a pending capital trial. In some, if not many, cases, it is
a combination of these reasons. But the same conversations
with skilled capital trial lawyers also establishes that many,
if not most, clients facing the ultimate punishment, can be
persuaded to accept a plea offer when it is in their best
interest to do so. Persuasion can often be a time-consuming
and labor-intensive process, and it may require the defense
team to enlist the assistance of others (e.g., the client’s
relatives, mental health professionals, inmates who
accepted similar plea bargains), but reasonably competent
counsel can in most cases convince a client that the sub-
stantial downside risks weigh against ‘‘rolling the dice’’ at
trial.19 And it is certainly never reasonable for trial counsel
for a capitally charged client to accept the client’s initial
rejection of a plea offer as ending the discussion.20
Given the number of cases in which people who rejected
plea offers were sentenced to death, there have been
remarkably few claims that trial counsel provided ineffec-
tive assistance for failing to persuade their client to accept
the offered plea.21 Regardless of the reasons for the dearth
of litigation challenging counsel’s lack of success in con-
vincing a client to accept a favorable offer pre-Lafler and
Frye,22 that will almost certainly change in the future, given
the Supreme Court’s recognition in those decisions that the
negotiation of a favorable plea bargain is the ‘‘critical point’’
for most defendants and that defense counsel have
‘‘responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires.’’23
The early evidence also suggests this is an area courts
will be forced to confront. Since the Court’s decision in
Lafler and Frye, there have been four reported decisions in
which death-sentenced inmates alleged ineffective assis-
tance of counsel arising from trial counsel’s failure to per-
suade them to accept a favorable plea bargain in a capital
case. Three of the four decisions either assume without
deciding or explicitly acknowledge that trial counsel in
a capital case have a Sixth Amendment obligation to
attempt to persuade their client to accept a plea bargain
which would spare their lives.24 In State v. Fry, the Ohio
Supreme Court assumed without deciding that counsel’s
performance was deficient for failing to enlist the defen-
dant’s family members to assist in convincing the
defendant to accept a plea to life.25 And in Overstreet v.
Wilson, a panel of the Seventh Circuit assumed, again
without deciding, that the Supreme Court’s recent deci-
sions require counsel in a capital case not only to convey the
offer, but to do so effectively.26 In both cases, the courts
rejected the claim because the defendants failed to show
prejudice.
The most detailed post-Frye and Lafler discussion of this
emerging issue is found in Johnson v. United States, a col-
lateral challenge to a federal death sentence.27 The peti-
tioner in Johnson raised, among other claims, several
challenges to counsel’s performance in failing to persuade
her to plead guilty in exchange for the government with-
drawing the death penalty as a sentencing option. One
claim centered around the fact that counsel spent little time
explaining to Ms. Johnson the strength of the government’s
case against her; rather, the only team member who spent
any substantial amount of time with the client was a para-
legal, who blindly accepted Ms. Johnson’s protestations of
innocence. Thus, the defense team failed to speak with
a unified voice, and they failed to enlist assistance from
Johnson’s family and friends to persuade her to accept the
plea bargain. The District Court was clearly bothered by
counsel’s inactivity:
I find it very troubling that trial counsel were unable
to present Johnson with a unified message that her
only realistic course was to accept a plea agreement
to life imprisonment; that they did not spend more
time with Johnson, and sooner, discussing plea
options; that they did not do more, and sooner, to
marshal and confront Johnson with evidence sug-
gesting that a plea to a life sentence was the only
realistic option; and that they did not do more, and
sooner, to enlist the aid of family members and
others to convince her to plead guilty to the charges
in order to escape the death penalty.28
However, the court was not persuaded that counsel’s
performance was outside the wide range of competent
assistance.
Nevertheless, the District Court did find objectively
unreasonable counsel’s continued attempts to persuade the
government to accept a term of years (as opposed to a life
sentence) after Ms. Johnson’s codefendant was sentenced
to death.29 However, the court ultimately concluded that
trial counsel’s deficient performance was not prejudicial
given Johnson’s pretrial protestations of innocence and the
corresponding lack of objective evidence that Johnson
would have accepted such a plea offer.30
Despite the fact that Johnson’s guilty plea claims failed31
(as did the claims in the other cases discussed above), there
are several reasons that counsel who represent death-
sentenced inmates should be at least (modestly) encour-
aged by the decision as a potential harbinger of better
things to come. First, Johnson is the first decision in the
death penalty context that found trial counsel’s perfor-
mance to be deficient during the plea bargaining phase of
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a capital trial representation. In doing so, the court relied
heavily upon the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Lafler
and Frye.32 Second, given Lafler and Frye’s clear statement
that in the current world of pleas not trials, counsel have
‘‘responsibilities in the plea bargain process . . . that must
be met to render the adequate assistance of counsel that the
Sixth Amendment requires,’’ and given the widely recog-
nized norm in the capital defense bar that reasonably
competent trial counsel can frequently persuade even the
most reluctant capitally charged client to accept a favorable
plea offer, it would seem to be only a matter of time before
a judge is faced with a set of facts that warrant a finding of
ineffective assistance of counsel.
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